The 'revisionist school' of party campaigning in Britain has successfully demonstrated the importance of party members (see, for example, Denver and Hands, 1997; Johnston and Pattie, 1995; and Seyd and Whiteley, 1992). We have, however, much less information about the size and resources of local constituency parties. This article reports data collected during the Committee on Standards in Public Life's investigations into party finance. The aim of the survey was to gain an impression of the resources and expenditure of local parties in a manner similar to the investigations undertaken during the Houghton Committee's investigations in the 1970s. The article then analyses predictors of local party strength.
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Membership Levels
gives the figures for the size of constituency parties between 1992 and 1997.
The picture is a very mixed one. These figures compare well with the findings of Denver and Hands in 1997. 1 Using estimates of party membership by election agents rather than constituency secretaries, the comparable means for parties in English constituencies was 781, 616 and 173 for the Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats respectively. In addition, the broad trends in membership are also borne out by studies from 1992 and 1997, although the decline in Conservative members (at least in English seats) does not appear to be as marked as that observed by Denver and Hands (1998: 78-9) .
The implications of these data are important. Firstly, questions of political legitimacy must arise where a party has as few as six members in an entire constituency. That party may stand no chance of winning the seat in question, but it would seem a matter of concern for a party to field a candidate in an area where it had such tiny support.
Quite apart from the question of mounting a campaign with so few members, the small size inevitably means that the roles of members identified by Seyd and Whiteley and others can scarcely be fulfilled. On the other hand, of course, some local parties are very strong in membership terms. Nevertheless, the wide dispersion is likely to be of concern to parties.
Income
Party income is also a key variable in terms of organizational strength. Whilst volunteer members can fulfil many functions unpaid, parties require money to field candidates, campaign in and between elections and simply to maintain a presence in the community. Local parties do not exist only at the times of elections, though they may be more visible at those times. Rather, parties attempt to maintain contact with the electorate throughout the various electoral cycles. Moreover, significant party activity takes place before the formal campaign begins in order to maximize the 8 8 efficiency of the campaign effort (Denver and Hands, 1998: 80-1) . In effect, many parties are almost continually campaigning due to the staggered local elections throughout the general election cycle. And for this, they need money. Table 3 shows the income of local constituency parties between 1992 and 1997, standardized at 1992 prices. As with the figures for membership, it reveals very wide variations, both between and within the parties. The Conservative Party is the wealthiest party at local level by some margin. The average income of a Conservative constituency party in 1997 was more than double the average of both Labour and the Liberal Democrats combined. However, local
Conservative Parties are suffering a decline in income. Mean Conservative income fell from around £47,000 in 1992 to just under £34,000 in 1997. Labour's mean income in 1992 was just over £7,000, and whilst there was a mid-general election cycle dip, the 1997 mean had risen to just over £8,000. The Liberal Democrats experienced a similar cycle, with a mean income in 1992 of almost £5,000, reaching just over £6,000 in 1997.
Yet the range of parties' incomes is very broad. The dispersion of Conservative local parties' income is considerably wider than is the case for Labour or the Liberal Democrats. It is clear that whilst there are some small kingdoms in evidence, there are also some paupers as well. Again therefore, there must some question as to how well constituency parties can operate with such low incomes. Moreover, it would seem that the Conservative Party as a whole would benefit from a degree of crosssubsidy.
For all parties, and for each year, levels of individual membership are positively correlated with levels of income. (The lowest correlation coefficient in any one year was 0.52, whilst the highest was 0.89; all coefficients were statistically significant at the 0.05 level, with all but one significant at the 0.01 level). This may interpreted in two ways. It could be that an increase in membership leads to an increase in income.
Alternatively, however, it could be that the more wealthy and established constituency parties are more able to recruit members, since they will be likely to be more visible and may offer more opportunities for recruitment.
Moreover whilst all parties appear to benefit financially from larger memberships, the relationship varies between parties. There is a stronger relationship for the Liberal For both Labour and the Liberal Democrats spending levels and dispersion reflected the general election cycle, suggesting that expenditure was far more differentiated at general elections. However, the general election cycle was not reflected in levels of
Conservative spending (though this may be linked to falling membership and income over the period). Nor, however, was there any real pattern in the dispersion of expenditure. This suggests that the overall, relative levels of Conservative parties' expenditure changed little over the course of the cycle, which in turn suggests that party expenditures at general elections were less targeted than one might expect.
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Overall, whilst Conservative spending fell, their constituency parties still spent considerably more than the other parties year on year. Clearly, this is a function of those parties generating more income, but the result is a clear disparity between the local parties' ability to spend money year on year. This is significant, because whilst party spending is restricted during election campaigns, there is no restriction between campaigns. Parties do not enter campaigns from a base starting point; thus a party's presence in the community will be cumulative. It might logically be argued therefore that expenditure levels both at and between elections would contribute to that presence (although at a national level, levels of year-on-year party spending have only a negligible effect upon levels of party popularity: see Fisher, 1999) . If that is the case, the Conservatives have a clear and substantial advantage over the other parties.
In turn Labour has an advantage over the Liberal Democrats, though that advantage is neither as pronounced as that between Conservatives and Labour at this level, nor between Labour and the Liberal Democrats at national level.
Influences on Party Strength
This section of the article examines aggregate predictors of local party strength, with strength being defined in terms of membership, income and expenditure. Analyses using the Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) data set are necessarily limited. The small sample size means that only bivariate analyses can reasonably be conducted and even then, the results should only be seen as broadly indicative.
Nevertheless, the analyses do appear to display clear patterns that are worthy of note.
However, the larger data set collected by Denver and Hands, which contains estimated levels of local party membership, allows us to analyse this variable more extensively.
Three sets of independent variables were selected, covering social, political and structural variables. The social variables selected were those commonly used to predict turnout (see for example Denver, 1998) as well as variables identified as being important by the party membership surveys (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Whiteley et al., 1994) . These cover class composition, population density, car ownership, housing tenure, age and ethnicity, and are all derived from the 1991 census.
The political variables concerned the electoral status of the constituencies. Three different variables were employed. First, marginality was used for parties placed either first or second in that constituency at the previous election. This variable has been used successfully by Denver and Hands (1997, 1998) to predict strength of party election campaigns.
However, in assessing party strength (as opposed to an election campaign), there is reason to suggest that this variable may not be wholly appropriate. The size of a party election campaign can change relatively easily depending upon the result of the previous election. If a seat becomes safe, it is relatively easy to downsize the subsequent campaign. With party organization, however, institutional inertia may mean that any change is more gradual and less responsive to individual election results. What is required, therefore are variables that measure a longer-term view of the likelihood of winning the seat. Two variables were used to capture this effect: an 'Index of Hope', based upon position in elections from 1979 onwards, and a measure of the net change in marginality in the seat for parties placed first or second, again in the period since 1979.
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The Index of Hope was calculated by giving scores to the first or second placed party in each constituency. That score diminished the further the election was from time t.
This captures whether a party at least had a chance of winning a seat over a period of up to four general elections. Thus, if a party had been in contention for a seat between 1979 and 1987, but not in 1992, the likelihood would be that the party organization would decline less rapidly than the electoral support. Details regarding the scoring on the index are provided in the Appendix. . This is not a wholly exact measure, but it does capture the fact that whilst boundaries may change, local organization may change less rapidly, and thus the political history of the area will continue to have some impact, even if the actual constituency boundary has changed. 17 The final set of variables was structural, and was designed to test the impact of boundary reorganization upon local parties. Two variables were used: the Boundary Change Index which represents the extent of change involved in the creation of the new constituency (Rallings and Thrasher, 1995) ; and an index of the number of local authorities represented within the constituency. A higher Boundary Change Index together with a higher number of local authorities represented in a constituency should lead to greater disruption to the local party. This, in turn, should be reflected in its organizational strength. Table 5 utilizes data collected by David Denver and Gordon Hands in their study of local party campaigning at the 1997 general election. Whilst these data are restricted to estimates of party membership in 1997, they offer two advantages over the CSPL data. First, the data cover Scotland and Wales in addition to England. Second, and more important, there are considerably more cases, permitting more detailed analysis of the data. That said, the following examinations were also run using the CSPL data.
Membership
The results, although not reported here, bear out those found using the more extensive data set. Note: **=p<0.01.
As Table 5 associated. Private tenure is positively associated, whilst public tenure is negatively so. Conservative parties flourish in areas of higher middle class composition.
Agricultural employment and population density are associated consistently, so that Conservative memberships are higher is more rural and less densely populated areas.
Finally, the proportion of non-whites is negatively associated with membership and vice versa.
The social profile of Liberal Democrat seats is similar to that of the Conservatives.
Thus, membership is positively associated with higher car ownership, private housing tenure, higher social class composition and higher proportions of people employed in agriculture; and it is negatively associated with young people, public housing, higher proportions of manual workers and non-whites and higher population density.
However, the effect of social variables is not entirely as might be expected for local Labour parties. To be sure, larger proportions of the young and non-whites, higher population density, together with lower proportions of households with cars and persons employed in agriculture, all appear to be associated with higher levels of Labour membership. However, it is also worth noting that unlike the Conservatives, it is not the public/private housing dichotomy that is associated with membership.
Rather it is ownership/non-ownership. In addition, at bivariate level, class as defined by occupation does not appear to impact upon membership. Only the proportion of economically active constituents (which would amongst other things, capture unemployment) is, as might be expected, negatively associated.
Income
Given that party income is strongly related to the level of party members, it might be expected that aggregate associates of membership would also be those associated with income. Using the CSPL data, this is broadly the case.
3 As far as political variables are concerned both Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties generate more income in areas of greater political strength. Moreover, for the Liberal Democrats, higher levels of marginality relative to the previous election are also strongly correlated with income, suggesting that local parties receive more money in marginal seats. For Labour, however, the association is counter-intuitive. The change over time in the size of the majority in the seat is significant, but positively correlated.
Structural variables are only associated with party income in the case of Conservative parties. The number of local authorities with wards in the constituency is positively associated with income. This finding is not as expected. It was hypothesized that this would be an indicator of organizational disruption, which might be expected to have a detrimental effect upon party resources. However, it appears as though the reverse may be the case, although this does fit with the aggregate correlations generated from the Denver and Hands data.
In terms of social variables, local Conservative parties generate most income in areas that one might expect; namely those with higher levels of economic activity, higher occupational class composition, higher proportions of owner occupancy, higher levels of car ownership and lower population density. Conversely, income is negatively correlated with higher proportions of manual workers and council tenants.
Similarly, in the case of Labour, those variables correlated with party income are also generally associated with party membership. Thus, the higher the density of 22 22 population, proportion of younger people, private renters and non-whites, and the lower the level of car ownership and owner occupation, the higher the Labour party income. For the Liberal Democrats however, social variables have virtually no impact upon income.
Expenditure
Since expenditure relies upon income to an extent, there is again likely to be a similar range of variables associated with local party expenditure as there is with income.
And indeed, that is broadly the case. 4 Conservative parties spend more in wealthier and less populated areas, whilst Labour does the reverse. However, what are critical here are the 'political' variables, since we might expect spending to be strongly associated with the electoral status of the seat. In the case of the Conservatives, it appears that they spend most in the areas of greatest electoral strength, a pattern also discovered by Denver and Hands when examining local campaigns (1997: 256-7). This is also broadly true for Labour and the Liberal Democrats, however. That said, Liberal Democrat parties are unlike other parties in that they also spend more in marginal seats.
Notwithstanding the small sample used in most of the analyses, these aggregate correlations suggest certain key patterns. First, political variables are useful for analysing patterns in local parties, especially in the case of the Liberal Democrats.
Moreover, the impact of political variables is both long-and short-term. Party strength is generally affected by both long-term status as incumbent or principal opponent, and by recent marginality.
By contrast structural variables have a far less consistent impact. Moreover, what impact they have is unclear: at bivariate level at least, the impact of structural disruption is positive as well as negative, depending on the party. Finally, social variables are useful in analysing patterns of local strength for the Conservative and Labour parties, but much less so in the case of the Liberal Democrats.
Multivariate Analysis of Membership
These bivariate analyses only provide a partial and indicative picture. The larger number of cases in the Denver and Hands data allows for multivariate analysis, which was not practical using the CSPL data. Consequently, the relationship between the aggregate predictors and local membership was examined using OLS regression. The stepwise method was used, which helped alleviate any problems of multi-collinearity that can occur when there are a number of variables measuring similar phenomena.
In addition to all of the variables analysed in Table 5 , a dummy variable detailing region was also included. Table 6 illustrates that party membership varies by region (or nation in the case of Scotland and Wales). This in itself might not be a significant predictor of constituency party membership. In theoretical terms, for example, there is 24 24 little reason to suspect that those Liberal Democrat parties would tend to be more populous in East Anglia than those in the West Midlands, simply on account of the geography. However, there could potentially be an impact associated with regions that are areas of core support for the parties. Thus, if party membership in East Anglia were higher generally, there would be the potential for a 'neighbourhood' effect in the constituencies located there. In order to control for this situation, regions were divided into 'Core' or Non-Core' areas. The criterion was simply that regions with above average memberships were defined as 'core', and those with below average memberships, 'non-core'. Details of core and non-core areas are shown in Table 6 . Membership of all parties is examined in Table 7 For Labour, renting property from either the local authority or the private sector has a positive impact on local membership, and local parties also have higher memberships in areas where there is a higher proportion of non-whites. What is also significant however, is that the proportion of non-manual workers in a constituency is positively associated with Labour membership. This variable was not statistically significant in the bivariate analysis and thus it is only significant when it interacts with the other variables. The finding might appear to be somewhat counter-intuitive. However, there are at least two possible 29 29 explanations. First, at the individual level Seyd and Whiteley (1992: 33) found that the membership was far more middle-class (measured by occupation) than working-class.
Second, studies of participation generally have frequently pointed to greater involvement by the middle classes. Whilst one cannot infer such patterns from these aggregate data, it may be a middle-class neighbourhood effect that produces this finding. On the other hand, given the similar counter-intuitive findings on Conservative memberships, it may be that the manual/non-manual measurement has outlived its usefulness for such analyses. Ironically, the proportion of non-manual workers in the constituency has the most explanatory power of all the independent variables. However, unlike the Conservatives, the Index of Hope has a stronger impact than all other social variables.
For the Liberal Democrats, only one social variable -the proportion of professional and managerial workers in a constituency -has a significant and positive effect. Thus it would appear that aggregate patterns in the membership of the Liberal Democrats are unlike those of the other parties. There is little social basis beyond the professional and managerial class and membership levels are very much rooted in the opportunities for electoral success.
Conclusion
These analyses highlight a number of important patterns. First, Conservative constituency parties appear to be in some decline, though they are still generally far better financed than Labour or Liberal Democrat parties. Second, there are very large variations in the size of parties. Despite the large size of some, there are others with tiny memberships, some as low as six. This presents a real problem of credibility in such constituencies. Third, the wide variations in income lead to equally wide variations in expenditure. Whilst election spending is restricted at local level, routine expenditure is not, which theoretically may lead to cumulative distortions over time should the wide disparities continue. Fourth, individuals are very important to the finances of all parties; not only in terms of simple membership, but also in terms of the money they provide for the parties.
Thus, it is clear that discussions of the disparities in parties' wealth need to go beyond a simple focus on the national party. Since local parties do matter these wide disparities are of importance. Thus, the Conservatives may be in decline, but there is still some way to go before there is financial parity with the other main parties.
In addition, the likely impact of Committee on Standards in Public Life's (and now the government's) recommendations is of significance. The proposed increase in regulation will mean that local parties will be required to spend some effort in regulating their financial affairs. The evidence from this survey is that some constituency parties will be much better equipped than others. It was patently clear from the returns that such things as consistency or institutional memory with local parties is a key variable. Therefore, it will be a matter of some concern as to whether these additional regulations can be carried out successfully. Of course, one might argue that local parties adapted to the 1883 regulations that continue to govern election spending today (the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act), but these only apply at elections. More stringent regulation will be required on a more regular basis. The question then arises of whether we should expect more from local parties. If parties cannot organize themselves sufficiently well or be in some way representative by way of having an acceptable level of membership, then questions about the legitimacy of party candidates must surely arise.
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The final point is that parties tend to be organizationally strong where they are already electorally strong. This is significant because since we know that local party campaigning matters, under existing electoral arrangements, this might be more likely to benefit incumbents over time. Of course, electoral change occurs, but the kind of local campaigns that are successful will have more difficulty in being mounted where the existing infrastructure is weak.
